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Abstract
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy-relevant information is revealed to the
elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politi-
cian discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable
when politicians do not share the electorate’s policy preferences. Optimal political repre-
sentation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (full
discretion) models. Ambiguous electoral platforms are essential for achieving beneficial
representation. Nevertheless, electoral competition does not ensure optimal representa-
tion: the winning candidate’s platform is generally overly ambiguous. While our theory
rationalizes a positive correlation between ambiguity and electoral success, it shows that
the relationship need not be causal.
Keywords: Electoral Competition, Divergence, Delegates or Trustees, Optimal Delegation.
∗We thank Takakazu Honryo for his contributions at an earlier stage of this project and Enrico Zanardo for
research assistance. Scott Ashworth, Chris Berry, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Chris Dobronyi, Jon Eguia, Alex
Frankel, Simone Galperti, Marina Halac, Adam Meirowitz, Pablo Montagnes, Ken Shotts, and the Editor and
anonymous referees provided helpful comments. Kartik is grateful for financial support from the NSF (grants
SES-1459877 and SES-115593).
†Department of Economics, Columbia University. Email: nkartik@columbia.edu
‡Department of Economics, University of Chicago. Email: rvanweelden@uchicago.edu
§Department of Government, London School of Economics. Email: s.wolton@lse.ac.uk
1. Introduction
It is common wisdom that “[p]oliticians are notoriously reluctant to take clear stands on
the issues of the day” (Page, 1976, p. 742). Indeed, during the 2012 American Presidential elec-
tion, media outlets routinely criticized the ambiguity of both Barack Obama’s and Mitt Rom-
ney’s campaign promises (Condon, 2012; Lizza, 2012). Even more recently, in the 2015 British
general election, the non-partisan Institute for Fiscal Studies described parties’ manifestos
as follows: “Where benefit cuts are proposed, they are largely unspecified (Conservatives),
vague (Liberal Democrats) or trivially small relative to the rhetoric being used (Labour)” (In-
stitute for Fiscal Studies, 2015).
While many scholars take a dim view of electoral ambiguity, we argue in this paper
that ambiguity is central to beneficial political representation. Our approach builds on the
Downsian framework, with one key twist. We posit that some information relevant to policy-
making is revealed to the elected politician only after the election. We allow candidates, who
are both office and policy motivated, to campaign by announcing a policy set. In other words,
each candidate commits to a set of policies from which he will choose if elected. A candidate
can propose a single policy (such as a precise figure for benefit cuts), commit to avoiding ex-
treme policies (such as a bound on benefit cuts), or could announce more complicated sets
(such as either a significant benefit cut or none at all).
Electoral ambiguity—i.e., not committing to a single policy—affords politicians discretion
to adapt policies to new information.1 While ambiguity creates uncertainty about which pol-
icy will be implemented, it can benefit voters if policies are better tailored to circumstances.
However, whenever politicians do not share voters’ policy preferences, voters also benefit
from constraints on discretion that mitigate post-electoral policy bias.2 Our framework thus
contributes to the classic question, dating back to James Madison and Edmund Burke, of
whether political representation should be by delegates or trustees. In our account, voters
seek a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (full discretion) models of political
representation.
Actual political representation, however, is determined by politicians’ strategic platform
choices. Candidates would like maximum discretion, but they must propose platforms that
1 Thus, our notion of ambiguity is that at the time of the election, voters are uncertain about what policy an
elected politician will implement. This notion follows Downs (1957), Shepsle (1972), and other authors. There
are more selective notions of ambiguity, such as Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921).
2 Our model allows for any degree of disagreement over policy between candidates and voters; for ease of
exposition, this introduction focuses on positive but limited disagreement.
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are attractive enough to the electorate—specifically, the representative or median voter (hence-
forth “the voter”)—relative to their opponent’s. We show that candidates’ equilibrium plat-
forms take a simple form: they retain some discretion but limit how far they can move policies
in the direction of their bias. Actual representation thus resembles optimal representation.
There is, however, a critical difference. The winning candidate is overly ambiguous from the
voter’s point of view unless candidates’ policy preferences are symmetrically biased relative
to the electorate. When candidates are asymmetric, the less-biased candidate wins the elec-
tion while exploiting his greater policy alignment to grant himself more discretion than is
optimal for the voter. So, while electoral competition disciplines the winning candidate, it is
not generally sufficient to ensure voter-optimal outcomes.
As predicted by our theory, one often observes candidates reassuring voters that their
policies would not be too extreme without spelling out exactly what they will do if elected.
Examples include the U.K. Conservative party promising in 2015 to increase funding for the
Department of Health by at least £8 billion (Watt, 2015); Mitt Romney pledging in 2012 that
his reform of social security would entail “no change for those at or near retirement” (Sahadi,
2012); and Barack Obama guaranteeing in 2008 that “no family making less than $250, 000 a
year will see any form of tax increase” (Obama, 2008).
Furthermore, consistent with empirical evidence (Berensky and Lewis, 2007; Tomz and
Van Houweling, 2009), we find that ambiguity is not punished by the electorate; to the con-
trary, the winning candidate is generally more ambiguous than his opponent. It bears empha-
sis that a candidate does not win because he is more ambiguous than his opponent; rather he
is both more ambiguous and more likely to win because he already possesses an electoral ad-
vantage of greater preference alignment. The electoral success of ambiguous candidates has
long puzzled political scientists; Downs (1957, p. 136) himself noted that “candidates [in the
real world] becloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity” despite the fact that ambiguity does
not arise in standard specifications of his framework. Some theoretical explanations rely on
voters’ risk preferences (Zeckhauser, 1969; Shepsle, 1972; Aragones and Postlewaite, 2002) or
“behavioral” characteristics (Berliant and Konishi, 2005; Callander and Wilson, 2008; Jensen,
2009). Our results, which are obtained with risk-averse voters, harken back to the dictum that
correlation does not imply causation.
Our model also generates policy divergence: the two candidates propose different plat-
forms and induce different expected final policies, tilted towards their own policy preferences.
Divergence occurs even when candidates are symmetrically biased and propose platforms
that are optimal for the voter. In this case, the voter is indifferent between the two candidates
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and the election can then be viewed as close. Consistent with the empirical results of Lee,
Moretti and Butler (2004), we find that divergence emerges even in close elections. Notably,
in our model the electorate is not merely electing policies; it is genuinely affecting them.
There is a non-monotonic relationship between policy divergence and political polariza-
tion (the difference in candidates’ preferences). Fixing platforms, greater political polarization
leads to greater policy divergence. But platforms also respond to political polarization. As a
candidate’s policy preferences move further away from the voter’s, electoral pressures in-
duce him to propose less ambiguous platforms: to appeal to the voter, he offers himself less
discretion. We find that, on balance, policy divergence is increasing in political polarization
when polarization is low and decreasing when polarization is high. Indeed, when candi-
dates’ policy preferences are very similar to the voter’s, they obviously choose approximately
the same policy and policy divergence disappears. In contrast, as political polarization gets
sufficiently large, policy divergence vanishes because candidates’ platforms converge to the
voter’s ex-ante preferred policy. One implication is that a given empirical observation of pol-
icy divergence could be consistent with multiple levels of underlying political polarization,
complicating identification of the level of political polarization.
We conclude this introduction by connecting our work to the most closely related liter-
ature. Meirowitz (2005) argues that both candidates and voters from their own party may
desire ambiguity—modeled as not announcing a position—in a primary election; this pre-
serves a candidate’s flexibility to adjust his position in the subsequent general election to new
information about the location of the whole electorate’s median voter.3 While there are some
formal similarities, our substantive focus on political representation is entirely different and
our modeling of electoral ambiguity is richer. By using policy sets to capture candidates’ am-
biguity, we follow Aragones and Neeman (2000). In their model candidates value ambiguity
while voters do not; see also Alesina and Cukierman (1990), Westermark (2004), and Frenkel
(2014). In our model all actors benefit from some electoral ambiguity because of a desire to
tailor policy to an initially-uncertain “state of the world.” How much ambiguity is desired
by the electorate depends on parameters such as candidates’ preference alignment and uncer-
tainty about the state.
Our work is related to the literature on delegation by a principal to a better-informed
agent, pioneered in economics by Holmstro¨m (1977, 1984) and adopted for the study of
the bureaucracy by Epstein and O’Halloran (1994) and others. Notable references include
3 Glazer (1990) and Kamada and Sugaya (2014) are other papers studying candidates’ ambiguity that stems
from uncertainty about voters’ preferences.
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Melumad and Shibano (1991), Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006), and Amador and
Bagwell (2013) in economics and Bendor and Meirowitz (2004), Gailmard (2009), and Wise-
man (2009) in political science. We specifically build on technical results of Alonso and Ma-
touschek (2008), who derive conditions for the optimality of interval delegation. In contrast
to the aforementioned papers, our framework has candidates (multiple agents) strategically
proposing platforms (delegation sets) to the voter (principal). We are not aware of any extant
literature on such “delegation games.” We establish conditions under which interval policy
sets emerge even in our more complex strategic environment, and use this result to derive
new insights about electoral competition and political representation.
There is virtually no formal work addressing the delegate-trustee trade-off in political
representation.4 To our knowledge, the only exception is Fox and Shotts (2009), who show
how either form of representation may emerge when voters are uncertain about politicians’
preferences and competence. Unlike our interest in electoral competition, theirs is in a model
of political accountability. Fox and Shotts (2009) also do not consider any intermediate cases
between a full delegate and a full trustee relationship. Our theory shows that optimal political
representation genuinely spans the entire spectrum between the two models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our formal model.
Section 3 characterizes optimal platforms from the voter’s perspective. Our main results are
in Section 4, which identifies the equilibrium platforms emerging from electoral competition
and their implications. In Section 5 we discuss how some alternative modeling choices would
affect our results. Section 6 concludes. Formal proofs of all results and some additional tech-
nical material are collected in the Appendices.
2. Model
We develop a model in the tradition of Downs (1957). There are two political candidates, L
(left) andR (right), and a single representative voter, denoted 0.5 The game form is as follows:
1. Each candidate i ∈ {L,R} simultaneously chooses a platform Ai ⊆ R.
2. The voter observes both platforms and elects one of the candidates, e ∈ {L,R}.
3. Nature determines a state of the world, θ ∈ [−1, 1], which is privately observed by the
elected candidate e.
4 There is, of course, a massive literature in political theory on representation to which we cannot do justice
here; see Urbinati and Warren (2008) for a review.
5 The focus on a single voter is for ease of exposition; we consider in Subsection 5.1 a heterogenous electorate
in which there is a decisive median voter.
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4. The elected candidate chooses a policy action, a ∈ Ai.
We assume that candidates have commitment power: the final policy must be consistent
with the candidate’s platform. Crucially, the impact of any policy depends on a state of the
world that is privately revealed to the elected politician only after the election but before his
policy choice.6 The state represents changing circumstances or new information that becomes
available to a politician at the time of actual policy-making. As David Cameron stated to
justify his child benefit cuts in an ITV interview in 2010, “We did not outline all those cuts, we
did not know exactly the situation we were going to inherit” (Wintour and Watt, 2010).
We allow candidates to choose platforms that are sets of policies. This approach general-
izes the standard model, as candidates can always propose a single policy (such as a precise
figure for benefit cuts). In practice, of course, candidates are not constrained to be specific dur-
ing their electoral campaigns, and they rarely choose to be. Notice that we have precluded
candidates from committing to policies as a function of the state. This is justified because
the state is privately observed by the office-holder; the voter only observes the chosen policy.
State-contingent promises during the election would generally not be credible. See Subsec-
tion 5.2 for further discussion.
Preferences. Each player i ∈ {L,R, 0} has policy preferences in state θ that are single-peaked
around a bliss point αi(θ) := bi + θ ∈ R. Specifically, player i’s policy utility is represented
by the quadratic-loss utility function −(a − θ − bi)2, where a is the policy.7 We normalize b0
to 0, and to capture candidates on opposite sides of the voter, we assume bL ≤ 0 ≤ bR. For
i ∈ {L,R}, |bi| measures the magnitude of preference (mis)alignment of candidate i with the
voter. We refer to a candidate with bi = 0 as unbiased, a candidate with bi 6= 0 as biased, and
a candidate with |bi| ≥ 1 as extreme. As the state lies in [−1, 1], an extreme candidate’s bliss
point is either always positive or always negative no matter the state.
Let e ∈ {L,R} denote the winner of the election. The voter only cares about policy, so her
overall utility function is simply
u0(a, θ, e) := −(a− θ)2.
6 By contrast, Martinelli and Matsui (2002), Heidhues and Lagerlof (2003), Kartik, Squintani and Tinn (2014),
and Ambrus, Baranovskyi and Kolb (2015) consider models in which politicians are privately informed about a
policy-relevant state prior to the election.
7 As usual (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987), one can also view players as having state-independent prefer-
ences over outcomes or consequences; the state affects how policies map into outcomes.
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Candidates are both policy and office motivated as in Wittman (1977, 1983) and Calvert (1985).
Specifically, candidate i ∈ {L,R} has the utility function
ui(a, θ, e) :=
φ− (a− bi − θ)2 if e = i,−(a− bi − θ)2 if e 6= i. (1)
The parameter φ > 0 measures the degree of office motivation.
Technical assumptions. The state θ ∈ [−1, 1] is distributed according to a cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) F that admits a differentiable density f . We assume f is positive and
symmetric (i.e., f(θ) = f(−θ) > 0), and that it does not change too fast:
for all θ ∈ [−1, 1] : −f(θ) ≤ f ′(θ) ≤ f(θ). (2)
Intuitively, condition (2) requires sufficiently diffuse beliefs. The condition is likely to be sat-
isfied in a policy domain where uncertainty about the appropriate policy is significant, such
as an economic or foreign-policy issue. On the other hand, the condition is less appropriate
for a social issue like abortion or gay rights.
We further impose that conditional expectations from tail truncations do not increase too
fast:
for all t ∈ [−1, 1] : d
dt
E[θ|θ ≥ t] < 1 and d
dt
E[θ|θ ≤ t] < 1. (3)
Requirement (3) is satisfied by all log-concave densities, which covers a number of familiar
distributions (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). Both the uniform distribution and the truncated
normal distribution with mean zero and variance that is not too small satisfy all our require-
ments; see Remark A.1. Requirements (2) and (3) ensure a transparent characterization of
delegation sets; we clarify the precise role subsequently (in particular, see fn. 11).
Finally, we require that each candidate i’s platform choiceAi must be a closed set, to ensure
the office-holder’s problem of choosing which policy to implement is well-behaved.
Solution Concept. All aspects of the model except the realization of the state θ are common
knowledge, and players are expected-utility maximizers. Our solution concept is Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium, hereafter simply equilibrium. (Standard refinements would not al-
ter our results.) Notice that because θ is observed only after the election, the office-holder’s
policymaking stage and the stage at which the voter chooses whom to elect both constitute
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proper subgames. Thus, an equilibrium satisfies the following properties: (i) if candidate i is
elected with platform Ai, in each state θ he chooses a ∈ Ai to maximize ui(·);8 (ii) taking (i) as
given, for any AL and AR the voter elects the candidate who gives her the highest expected
utility; (iii) taking (i) and (ii) as given, each candidate i proposes a platform Ai that maximizes
his expected utility.9
Terminology. We say that a platform Ai is minimal if it contains no redundant policy: every
a ∈ Ai will be chosen in some state if i is elected. To simplify the exposition and without
any real loss of generality, we restrict attention to equilibria in which candidates use minimal
platforms.10 We say that (platform) convergence occurs if both candidates propose the same
platform: AL = AR. This is a weak notion of convergence because it does not imply that both
candidates implement the same policy if elected. Indeed, final policies coincide in all states
only if either the candidates converge to a singleton platform (AL = AR = {a} for some a ∈ R)
or they share the same policy preferences (bL = bR = 0). When Ai is not a singleton, we say
that candidate i’s platform is ambiguous. In other words, we view a candidate as ambigu-
ous when the voter is uncertain about what policy will be implemented after the election, as
argued by Page (1976). This perspective on ambiguity is shared by many others in the liter-
ature, including Downs (1957), Shepsle (1972), Aragones and Neeman (2000), and Aragones
and Postlewaite (2002).
Finally, we view an equilibrium’s outcome as its (distribution over the) winning candidate
and its (possibly stochastic) mapping from states to final policies. In particular, two outcome-
equivalent equilibria provide the same expected payoff to all players.
To wrap up this section, we would like to highlight that absent the unknown state of
the world, our model satisfies all the assumptions of the Downsian framework (with policy
motivated candidates): two candidates, unidimensional policy space, strictly concave util-
ity functions, no uncertainty about voters’ and candidates’ preferences, and commitment by
candidates to their platforms. Consequently, convergence would emerge if there were no
uncertainty about the state of the world, or, as shown in Subsection 5.2, if platforms were
constrained to single policies. With uncertainty about the state and ambiguity, however, can-
didates with different preferences will not always choose the same policy even if elected with
8 As the state is continuously distributed, an “almost all” qualifier is relevant here and elsewhere; we omit
this technicality to ease the exposition.
9 Our analysis covers the possibility that candidates may mix over their platforms; as established in Lemma 1
below, candidates will not mix in equilibrium except possibly when they never win the election.
10 Dropping this restriction creates some additional but irrelevant multiplicity: the additional equilibria that
emerge are outcome-equivalent to those we focus on.
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the same platform. This feature generally precludes candidates from perfectly mimicking
each other, unlike in most models of electoral competition.
3. Optimal Political Representation
We first characterize candidates’ optimal platforms from the voter’s perspective. In other
words, we identify what platform the voter would like to endow each candidate i ∈ {L,R}
with if i is going to be the office-holder. We call such a platform candidate i’s voter-optimal
platform. A singleton policy platform is not necessarily voter-optimal because the voter would
like the policy to be adapted ex-post to the state of the world. On the other hand, giving full
discretion need not be optimal either because of the candidate’s policy bias.
Proposition 1 below describes how the voter resolves this trade-off between policy adapt-
ability and policy bias. Recall that αi(θ) = bi + θ denotes candidate i’s ideal policy in state θ.
It is convenient to define a0 ∈ [0, 1] and a0 ∈ [−1, 0] as the solutions to
a0 = E[θ|θ ≥ a0 − bR] and a0 = E[θ|θ ≤ a0 − bL]. (4)
Condition (3) ensures that a0 and a0 are uniquely defined. Furthermore, a0 ≤ bR+1 (a0 ≥ bL − 1)
with equality if and only if bR = 0 (bL = 0), and a0 = 0 (a0 = 0) whenever bR ≥ 1 (bL ≤ −1).
The symmetry of the state distribution also implies that a0 = −a0 whenever bR = −bL.
To interpret (4), consider placing a ceiling a0 on candidate R’s policy choice. R will
then choose a0 whenever the state is larger than a0 − bR. The voter’s preferred policy given
θ ≥ a0 − bR is simply E[θ|θ ≥ a0 − bR]. Thus, the first equality in (4) requires that, on average,
the voter receives her preferred policy when the policy ceiling on R binds.
Proposition 1. Candidate R’s voter-optimal platform is
A0R :=
{0} if bR ≥ 1,[αR(−1), a0] if bR ∈ [0, 1).
Symmetrically, candidate L’s voter-optimal platform is
A0L :=
{0} if bL ≤ −1,[a0, αL(1)] if bL ∈ (−1, 0].
Proposition 1 says a candidate’s voter-optimal platform is a (possibly degenerate) interval.
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Technically, the problem of finding a voter-optimal platform is the same as that of a princi-
pal optimally deciding how much discretion to grant an informed agent with biased prefer-
ences. We do not require the voter to grant the politician an interval of policies to choose
from. Indeed, in general, such interval delegation sets need not be optimal.11 However, as the
proof of Proposition 1 establishes, our assumptions on the state distribution—in particular,
requirements (2) and (3)—satisfy Alonso and Matouschek’s (2008) more general conditions
guaranteeing optimality of interval delegation sets for any bias.
The optimal intervals in Proposition 1 resolve the fundamental trade-off the voter faces
between policy adaptability and the resulting policy bias (or, as it is sometimes referred to,
policy drift). Plainly, when a politician is unbiased (bi = 0), it is voter-optimal to impose no
constraints, as there is no trade-off. When a politician is extreme (|bi| ≥ 1), the cost from policy
bias is large relative to the gain from policy adaptability, and so the voter-optimal platform
is a singleton: her ex-ante preferred policy, {0}. When a politician is biased but moderate
(|bi| ∈ (0, 1)), it is optimal for the voter to endow him with some but not full discretion.
Candidate R’s preferred policy is above the voter’s preferred policy in any state. There is
thus no benefit to the voter of imposing a minimum policy on R. However, she may want to
limit how far to the right R can push policy. R’s voter-optimal platform is thus an interval
from αR(−1), the lowest policy R would ever take, up to a ceiling. Calculus determines the
optimal ceiling to be a0, defined in Equation 4. The reasoning is reversed for candidate L, who
prefers policies lower than the voter in each state: L’s voter-optimal platform is an interval
with a floor on L’s policy options.
Interval delegation, while common in the study of the bureaucracy (Gailmard and Patty,
2012), has not received attention in electoral politics. It has the intuitive property that the voter
would like a politician to utilize his expertise but not distort policies excessively towards his
own preferences. In our theory, then, optimal political representation takes a particular form:
a mixture of the trustee model (full discretion) and the delegate model (no discretion). In fact,
both models arise only as special cases. The trustee model is optimal when the politician is un-
biased while the delegate model is optimal when the politician is extreme. Notice that, unless
a politician is extreme, ambiguous platforms are necessary to attain optimal representation.
Proposition 1 implies interesting comparative statics, which we summarize next. Let
11 Here is a simple example in which interval delegation would not be optimal: the state has a binary support
{−1, 1} and candidate i’s bias satisfies |bi| ∈ (0, 1). In this case, any interval platform from candidate i is subop-
timal for the voter; the (minimal) voter-optimal platform is {−1, 1}. While the example uses a binary support,
the same point could be made using continuous distributions approximating binary support; such distributions
would violate requirements (2) and (3).
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ai(θ, A) denote the policy chosen by candidate i in state θ when elected with platform A,
and let Wj(A, i) be the expected utility of player j ∈ {0, L,R} when candidate i ∈ {L,R} is
elected with platform A ⊆ R.12
Proposition 2. For any i ∈ {L,R} and bi with |bi| ∈ (0, 1):
1. A0i is decreasing (in the sense of set inclusion) in |bi|;13
2. W0(A0i , i) is decreasing in |bi|;
3. E[aL(θ, A0L)] < 0 < E[aR(θ, A0R)], with lim
bi→0
E[ai(θ, A0i )] = lim|bi|→1
E[ai(θ, A0i )] = 0.
Proposition 2 focuses on the case where politicians are neither unbiased nor extreme, be-
cause those cases are trivial. Part 1 says that when a politician is more biased it is optimal to
grant him less discretion, because the gain from limiting policy bias increases. Part 2 of Propo-
sition 2 says that, unsurprisingly, the voter is worse off when a politician is more biased, even
under the voter-optimal platform. Finally, part 3 says that a politician’s policy choice given
the voter-optimal platform is tilted in expectation towards his own policy preferences. How-
ever, the average policy bias—as measured by E[ai(θ, A0i )], since the voter’s ideal policy is on
expectation 0—is non-monotonic in the politician’s bias. When a politician is unbiased, he
is given full discretion and chooses the voter’s ideal policy in each state, which obviously
induces no average policy bias. When a politician is extreme, average policy bias again van-
ishes, but now because the politician is optimally given no discretion; he is constrained to
only choose the voter’s ex-ante preferred policy, 0. Average policy bias emerges optimally
only when a politician is moderately biased.
Figure 1 summarizes some aspects of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 by depicting the
voter-optimal policy ceiling for candidate R as well as the corresponding expected policy.
4. Equilibrium Ambiguity and Political Representation
While Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 characterize properties of the voter-optimal plat-
form, the voter does not actually choose a candidate’s platform; rather, each candidate is free
to propose any platform he would like. Plainly, conditional on being elected, a candidate
12 Explicitly: ai(θ,A) ∈ argmin
a∈A
(a − bi − θ)2; if there are multiple minimizers, any one can be chosen. Also,
Wj(Ai, i) := φI{i=j} −
∫ 1
−1 (ai(θ,Ai)− bj − θ)2 f(θ)dθ, where I denotes the indicator function.
13 Throughout the paper, “decreasing” without a qualifier means “strictly decreasing”, and analogously for
“increasing” and “preferred.”
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Figure 1 – Candidate R’s voter-optimal ceiling (black dashed line) and resulting expected
policy (blue solid curve) as a function of bR, given a uniform distribution of the state.
always benefits from greater discretion (a larger Ai in the sense of set inclusion). The only
reason for him to propose a platform that limits his discretion is to secure office, both because
he values office per se and in order to avoid his opponent tilting policies away from his prefer-
ences. In this section, we study how the office-holder’s equilibrium discretion emerges from
electoral competition and the strategic interplay between candidates.
Candidates are essentially unconstrained in their platform choices. Nevertheless, a win-
ning candidate’s equilibrium platform takes a simple form: he either proposes a single policy
or constrains how far he can move policy in the direction of his bias.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium in which candidate i ∈ {L,R} wins with positive probability, he plays
a pure strategy, choosing a platform A∗i such that:
1. A∗R satisfies either (i)A∗R = {a∗R}with a∗R ≥ 0, or (ii)A∗R = [αR(−1), a∗R] with a∗R ∈ [a0, αR(1)];
2. A∗L satisfies either (i) A∗L = {a∗L} with a∗L ≤ 0, or (ii) A∗L = [a∗L, αL(1)] with a∗L ∈ [αL(−1), a0].
Lemma 1 says that equilibrium platforms are singletons or intervals (for candidates who
win with positive probability), analogous to voter-optimal platforms (Proposition 1). The key
idea is that a candidate will only propose platforms that maximize a weighted average of his
own utility and the voter’s. Only singleton or interval platforms have this property; any other
platform would neither help a candidate win the election, nor, conditional on winning, benefit
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him either.14 A subtle but noteworthy feature of equilibrium strategies is that a candidate who
wins with positive probability does not randomize over platforms.
Notwithstanding the similarities, Lemma 1 also points to an important distinction be-
tween equilibrium platforms and voter-optimal platforms. While both could be intervals that
constrain a politician from choosing policies too far in the direction of his policy bias, the for-
mer may entail more—but not less—discretion. Our main result, Proposition 3 develops this
further by providing a full characterization of the equilibrium platforms. Recall that W0(A, i)
is the voter’s expected utility when candidate i ∈ {L,R} is elected with platform A ⊆ R.
Proposition 3. Let bR ≤ −bL, so that candidate R is no more biased than L.15 An equilibrium exists.
Furthermore:
1. If bR ≥ 1, then in any equilibrium A∗i = A0i = {0} for each i ∈ {L,R}.
2. If bR = 0, then in any equilibrium if i ∈ {L,R} is elected he has bi = 0 and A∗i = A0i = [−1, 1].
3. If bR = −bL ∈ (0, 1), then in any equilibrium A∗L = A0L = [a0, αL(1)] and A∗R = A0R =
[αR(−1), a0].
4. If bR ∈ (0,min{−bL, 1}) and W0(A0L, L) > W0(R, R), then there is a unique equilibrium. It
is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which (i) A∗L = A0L, (ii) A∗R = [αR(−1), a∗R], where a∗R ∈
(a0, αR(1)) is the unique solution to W0(A0L, L) = W0([αR(−1), a∗R], R), and (iii) the voter
elects R.
5. If bR ∈ (0,min{−bL, 1}) and W0(A0L, L) ≤ W0(R, R), then there is a unique equilibrium out-
come. In any equilibrium A∗R = [αR(−1), αR(1)] and the voter elects R.
Proposition 3 shows that the winning platform is equal to the voter-optimal platform only
in three special cases: (i) both candidates are extreme (part 1), (ii) at least one candidate is
unbiased (part 2), or (iii) candidates’ biases are perfectly symmetric (part 3). In any other case
(parts 4 and 5), the more moderate candidate wins the election with certainty while obtaining
more discretion than is voter-optimal. This does not imply, however, that the voter is better
off with more extreme candidates because they propose their voter-optimal platform. In fact,
14 The formal proof of Lemma 1 shows that one can map a winning candidate’s program into an optimal
delegation problem similar to the previous section’s but with a fictitious principal whose utility is given by a
suitably-chosen convex combination of the voter’s and candidate’s utilities. This problem is in turn isomorphic
to the previous section’s but with a scaled-down bias for the candidate.
15 The case in which L is no more biased than R, i.e. bR ≥ −bL, is analogous.
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as we establish later, more moderate candidates can only increase the voter’s welfare because
their policy choice is on average closer to the voter’s preferred policy.
To understand Proposition 3, begin by observing that when candidates L and R are biased
but equally so (−bL = bR > 0), they must each offer their voter-optimal platforms. If one
didn’t, say L with AL 6= A0L, then R can propose a platform AR that (i) guarantees he wins
the election (i.e., AR such that W0(AR, R) > W0(AL, L)) and (ii) gives him more discretion
than his voter-optimal platform (e.g., AR = [αR(−1), aR] with aR ∈ (a0, αR(1)]). But such
platforms cannot constitute an equilibrium because L would in turn prefer to offer a platform
that provides the voter with higher utility than AR, guaranteeing victory for L instead of R.16
Parts 4 and 5 of the Proposition follow from the fact that when candidate R is ex-ante ad-
vantaged because he is less biased than L (bR < −bL) and not extreme (bR < 1), he can guar-
antee victory by offering his voter-optimal platform, A0R. But since he prefers more discretion,
he will instead offer the most discretionary platform subject to the constraint of providing
the voter at least as much utility as L does when L proposes his voter-optimal platform. The
distinction between parts 4 and 5 concerns whether R could be defeated by L if R proposes
a platform that is too discretionary. If L’s voter-optimal platform, A0L, is preferred by the
voter to R having full discretion, then equilibrium forces L to offer precisely that platform
and the voter to resolve her equilibrium indifference between the two candidates in favor of
R (part 4). In this case we say that electoral competition is effective, since the presence of L,
even though he doesn’t win, influences the equilibrium outcome. If instead R is sufficiently
advantaged because bR is sufficiently smaller than −bL, then R wins with full discretion no
matter what platform L offers. In this case, any platform of L can be supported in equilibrium
(part 5). Subsection 5.3 shows that adding aggregate uncertainty pins downs both candidates’
behavior regardless of their biases.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the expected equilibrium policy, compar-
ing it with the expected policy under optimal representation. When the bias of candidate R is
small enough, he wins with full discretion, and so the equilibrium policy is always bR higher
than the voter’s preferred policy; this explains the 45 degree line portion of the figure. As bR
further increases towards −bL, candidate R is forced to place more constraints on his discre-
tion in order to win, which decreases the expected policy. When bR crosses the threshold −bL,
L now wins the election, giving himself increasing amounts of discretion until bR becomes
16 It can be checked that there is such a platform that L would prefer to be elected with rather than letting R
win with AR (see Lemma B.4). Note that if bR = bL = 0, then it is not necessary that both candidates choose the
voter-optimal platform [−1, 1]; only one need do so because the voter could break indifference in favor of that
candidate. This point explains the difference between parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 3.
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large enough that L is elected with full discretion. Thereafter, increases in bR have no effect
on equilibrium policies, which explains the flat line portion of the figure. Notice that except
when bR = −bL or when bR = 0, the expected policy distortion in the direction of the winning
candidate’s bias is greater in equilibrium than under optimal representation.
Figure 2 – Expected equilibrium policy as a function of bR.
Candidate R is elected when when bR < −bL; candidate L is elected when bR > −bL. The blue solid curve
is the expected equilibrium policy. The black dashed line is the expected policy under optimal representation.
Parameter values: bL = −1/2, θ ∼ U [−1, 1].
We now turn to the important implications of Proposition 3. If electoral competition is not
effective or if at least one candidate is unbiased, matters are straightforward: the advantaged
candidate or one of the unbiased candidates gets elected and has full discretion. For this
reason we focus in the rest of this section on effective electoral competition in which both
candidates are biased.
First, our theory predicts that convergence does not generally occur.
Implication 1. Convergence occurs if and only if both candidates are extreme or a0 = 1− bR = 1 + bL.
(Appendix B.4 details how this and subsequent implications follow from parts 1, 3, and 4
of Proposition 3.)
Convergence occurs if and only if either (i) candidates are extreme, or (ii) they are symmet-
ric, bL = −bR, and the knife-edge condition a0 = 1 − bR holds. In both the Downsian setting
and in ours, convergence is at the voter-optimal platform, which maximizes both candidates’
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electoral chances. In our setting, only when candidates are extreme does the voter-optimal
platform reduce to the voter’s ex-ante optimal policy, precluding policy adaptation altogether.
When candidates’ policy preferences are moderate (i.e., at least one candidate i has |bi| < 1),
candidates typically propose divergent platforms. Further, divergence in platforms implies
divergence in expected policies.
Implication 2. Unless a candidate is extreme, the expected policy he chooses if elected is biased in the
direction of his policy preference.
As the voter’s behavior is entirely predictable in our baseline model (which is relaxed in
Subsection 5.3), the candidates’ platforms are invariant to the office motivation parameter φ.
Hence, equilibrium divergence persists even as φ → ∞. By contrast, in canonical models
of divergence with policy-motivated candidates (Wittman, 1983; Calvert, 1985), divergence
vanishes as candidates become primarily office motivated.
Divergence is intricately tied to ambiguity as only extreme candidates propose single pol-
icy platforms. More interesting is the relationship between ambiguity and electoral success.
To state the next implication, we measure the extent of candidates’ ambiguity by the variance
of their ex-post policies.17 A candidate’s platform is ambiguous if and only if the variance of
his ex-post policies is non-zero; a higher variance reflects more ambiguity in the sense of more
uncertainty about the policy the candidate will choose if elected.
Implication 3. When the two candidates are not equally ambiguous, the more ambiguous candidate
always wins the election.
This implication follows from part 4 of Proposition 3. When candidate R is less biased
than L, not only is R’s voter-optimal platform more ambiguous than L’s, but moreover, R can
take advantage of his policy alignment by winning the election with a platform that has even
greater ambiguity than his voter-optimal platform. L is unable to undercut R even though L
offers his voter-optimal platform.
The electoral success of ambiguous candidates has long puzzled political scientists. Our
theory shows that analysts must be careful with the direction of causality: in our model,
a candidate does not win because he is more ambiguous than his opponent; rather, he is
more ambiguous because he is able to win by exploiting his ex-ante electoral advantage of
preference alignment.
17 We use the variance for simplicity. As shown in Lemma B.9, in equilibrium the candidate with a wider
interval platform has greater variance in his ex-post policy.
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Our next implication fleshes out a comparative static concerning policy divergence. We
focus on the case with symmetric biases and consider how the degree of policy divergence
depends on the level of political polarization. We measure the expected policy divergence by
the difference in expected policies of the two candidates (i.e., E[aR(θ, A∗R)]− E[aL(θ, A∗L)]) and
political polarization by the difference in policy preferences (i.e., bR − bL).
Implication 4. When bR = −bL = b ∈ (0, 1), expected policy divergence is non-monotonic in
political polarization. Expected policy divergence is initially increasing in polarization (when b ≈ 0)
and eventually decreasing in polarization (when b ≈ 1).
Fixing any pair of platforms, at least one of which is ambiguous, an increase in polar-
ization increases expected policy divergence. However, equilibrium platforms also change
with polarization. In particular, symmetrically-biased candidates who become more polar-
ized impose more stringent constraints on their policy choices in order to win the election.
Consequently, expected policy divergence can decrease as polarization increases; it necessar-
ily does when candidates become extreme, as platforms then converge to {0}. Implication 4
has important consequences for the empirical study of political polarization. It demonstrates
that any measure of average policy divergence is consistent with at least two levels of political
polarization; higher political polarization is compatible with lower average policy divergence.
While electoral competition generally produces divergent and ambiguous platforms, it is
beneficial to the voter because she values policy adaptability. This normative conclusion con-
trasts with most of the literature on electoral competition, which often views both divergence
and ambiguity as undesirable.18
Implication 5. The voter’s equilibrium welfare in a divergent equilibrium is higher than it would be
under convergence to singleton platforms.
However, electoral competition in our framework does not generally lead to optimal out-
comes for the voter.
Implication 6. Effective electoral competition induces candidates to limit ambiguity in a manner de-
sired by the voter. However, it is not sufficient to guarantee voter-optimal platforms unless candidates
are symmetrically biased or extreme; in any other case, the winning candidate is overly ambiguous.
18 For example, see Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2010) and Azzimonti (2011) on divergence and Page (1976) and
Aragones and Neeman (2000) on ambiguity. Exceptions include Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009) and
Van Weelden (2013) on divergence and Shepsle (1972) and Callander and Wilson (2008) on ambiguity.
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Put differently, electoral competition benefits the voter as long as it is effective, but except
in special cases, it does not lead to optimal political representation. Equilibrium political
representation is generally a mixture of the trustee and delegate models, but overly tilted
towards trusteeship from the voter’s point of view. By contrast, in the traditional Downsian
framework the (median) voter always obtains her preferred outcome.19
One salient case in which each candidate proposes his voter-optimal platform is when
candidates are symmetrically biased.20 Nonetheless, unless they are extreme they implement
different policies when elected. As the voter is indifferent between the two candidates, she
could toss a fair coin to determine the winner. It follows that close elections—elections that each
candidate is equally likely to win—are compatible with divergent platforms and expected
policy divergence. Our theory thus rationalizes Lee, Moretti and Butler’s (2004) empirical
finding of policy divergence in close elections. In our framework, this does not imply that
the electorate merely elects policies; rather, divergence in close elections is consistent with
candidates proposing their voter-optimal platforms.
Finally, we highlight the disciplining effect of elections by noting that the voter’s welfare
depends not only on the winning candidate’s bias, but also on the losing candidate’s.
Implication 7. If the candidates are moderate and symmetrically biased, the voter’s utility is decreas-
ing in the level of their bias. If the candidates are moderate and asymmetrically biased, the voter’s
utility is decreasing in the losing candidate’s bias, and constant in the winning candidate’s bias.
When the candidate’s are symmetrically biased, candidates propose their voter-optimal
platform in equilibrium, and voter welfare is decreasing in the candidates’ bias. In an effective
election with asymmetric candidates the more moderate candidate wins while making the
voter indifferent between the candidates; hence, the voter’s utility is determined by the utility
she would receive from the voter-optimal platform of the losing candidate. It should be noted
that Implication 7 refers only to effective elections: when the candidates’ biases are sufficiently
asymmetric, the more moderate candidate wins the election while proposing full discretion,
and the voter’s utility depends only on the bias of the winning candidate.
19 As noted by Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009), the Downsian model with policy motivated candi-
dates and uncertainty about the median voter’s location/preferences (Wittman, 1983; Calvert, 1985) also entails
inefficiency.
20 Literally taken, this point owes to our assumption of a symmetric state distribution. The broader point is that
voter-optimal platforms should only be expected when neither candidate has a pre-existing electoral advantage.
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5. Extensions
We now discuss the robustness of our main results to some extensions.
5.1. Heterogenous Voters
Suppose there are 2N + 1 (N ∈ N) voters. Each voter v ∈ {v−N , . . . , v−1, 0, v1, . . . , vN} has
utility function
uv(a, θ) := −(a− v − θ)2,
with v−N < · · · < v−1 < 0 < v1 < · · · < vN . The median voter, v = 0, has the same utility
function as the representative voter in our baseline model. Owing to quadratic loss utility
functions, the median voter is decisive.
Proposition 4. Consider any pair of platforms, Ai and Aj . Electing candidate i ∈ {L,R} with
platform Ai is preferred to electing candidate j ∈ {L,R} with platform Aj by a majority of voters if
and only if W0(Ai, i) > W0(Aj, j).
Proposition 4 implies that the optimal platform for candidate i from the perspective of
the median voter is the unique Condorcet winner among i’s platforms in a heterogeneous
electorate. It follows that the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 3 and all our other
insights remain valid with a heterogeneous electorate.
5.2. Alternative Assumptions About Commitment
We have assumed that candidates’ campaign promises take the form of a set of policy
options. We now discuss why this assumption is key for our results, returning to the single-
voter model for simplicity.
Suppose first that candidates are constrained to offer the voter only a single policy. The
voter’s ex-ante preferred policy is 0, and candidates face the same strategic problem as in the
classical Downsian framework. Equilibrium platforms are non-ambiguous (by stipulation)
and convergent (in equilibrium). Precluding ambiguous platforms necessarily reduces the
voter’s welfare unless both candidates are extreme, in which case it has no effect.
Suppose next that candidates can make state-contingent promises. For example, they
might announce the level of benefit cuts for each possible contingency, effectively making
a pronouncement such as “If the budgetary deficit turns out to be θ1 then I will cut benefits
by a1, if it is θ2 then I will cut benefits by a2, . . . ” Such commitments are enforceable only if
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the state of the world is easily observable by the voter, which it often is not. But if such com-
mitments were feasible, there would again be convergence: both candidates would commit to
implementing a policy that matches the state of the world. Non-verifiability of the state may
thus harm the voter in two ways: not only could the office-holder tilt policies towards his
own bliss point given his platform, but the winning platform itself may be over-ambiguous.
5.3. Probabilistic Voting
We have assumed that elections are deterministic, in the sense that candidates can per-
fectly predict how the electorate will respond to their platforms. Suppose now that after
candidates choose their platforms, the voter’s preference is affected by a “valence” shock be-
fore she votes. Denoting the valence shock by η and the elected candidate by e, we suppose
the voter’s utility function is u0(a, θ, e) := −(a− θ)2 + ηI{e=L}. Thus η > 0 (η < 0) corresponds
to candidate L (R) having a valence advantage.
It is common knowledge that η is distributed on the interval [−λ, λ] according to a CDF
G with a positive density g. To simplify the exposition, we focus on candidates who are
biased but not extreme, and we assume that the valence shock can be “large enough”: even
a candidate with |bi| = 1 proposing full discretion wins with positive probability against an
unbiased candidate proposing full discretion.21 When candidate L proposes platform AL and
candidate R proposes platform AR, the voter now elects candidate R (ignoring indifference,
which will be an event with zero probability) if and only if η < W0(AR, R)−W0(AL, L).
It is well known since Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) that uncertainty about the voter’s
preferences induces policy-motivated candidates to propose divergent platforms. Intuitively,
probabilistic voting reduces a candidate’s electoral cost of tilting platforms towards his own
preferred platform. This force is also in effect in our setting.
Proposition 5. Suppose |bi| ∈ (0, 1) for each i ∈ {L,R}. Then in every pure-strategy equilibrium:
1. A∗L = [a∗L, αL(1)] with a∗L ∈ (αL(−1), a0), and A∗R = [αR(−1), a∗R] with a∗R ∈ (a0, αR(1)).





Proposition 5 characterizes candidates’ behavior in any pure-strategy equilibrium.22 Un-
21 Formally, we assume λ ≥ −W0([αi(−1), αi(1)], i) for all bi ∈ [−1, 1].
22 Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is generally not guaranteed in models with probabilistic voting
without some assumptions on the distribution of the aggregate uncertainty. The technical reason is that a
candidate’s payoff need not be quasi-concave in his platform. We show in Appendix C that a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists in our setting when the valence shock is uniformly distributed. We also show there that a
mixed-strategy equilibrium is assured regardless of the distribution of the valence shock, and that versions of
the statements in Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 hold for mixed-strategy equilibria.
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der probabilistic voting, even symmetric candidates propose more ambiguous platforms than
is voter-optimal (Proposition 5 part 1), in contrast to our baseline result (Proposition 3 part 3).
The reason is that the electoral cost of proposing a slightly more ambiguous platform is sec-
ond order, whereas the benefit from having more discretion when elected is first order. The
degree of divergence from the voter-optimal platform turns on how much candidates care
about office relative to policy, as in Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985). As office motivation
becomes paramount, both candidates try to maximize their probability of winning, which
leads them towards proposing their respective voter-optimal platforms even when they are
asymmetrically biased (Proposition 5 part 2). Thus, probabilistic voting can either increase or
decrease ambiguity, depending on candidates’ biases and office motivation.
Despite the new features induced by probabilistic voting, one central point remains un-
changed. When neither candidate has an ex-ante valence advantage (i.e., G(0) = 1/2), greater
ambiguity is associated with greater electoral success, at least when candidates are sufficiently
office motivated. As before, this positive correlation is a consequence of a more moderate can-
didate’s ex-ante electoral advantage.
Proposition 6. Assume |bi| < |b−i| for some i ∈ {L,R} and focus on pure strategy equilibria. If
G(0) = 1/2, then there exists a φ such that when φ > φ, candidate i is more ambiguous than his
opponent and wins with probability greater than 1/2.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduces a new model of electoral competition in which policy relevant infor-
mation is revealed to the elected politician after he takes office. Our framework is well suited
to formally studying a classical issue in the theory of political representation. We find that op-
timal political representation consists of a mixture of the trustee and delegate models: voters
would like politicians to have some discretion to adapt policies to changing circumstances,
but also constrain how much they can do so to mitigate policy bias. Discretion is obtained
through ambiguous electoral platforms. While electoral competition generally benefits vot-
ers, it need not lead to optimal political representation; there is instead a slant towards excess
trusteeship. Candidates typically propose divergent and ambiguous platforms. Our theory
thus provides a single rationale for two well-documented empirical facts. We also find that
the more ambiguous candidate is more likely to win. However, ambiguity does not cause
electoral success; rather, the correlation is a consequence of a more moderate candidate’s pre-
existing electoral advantage.
To isolate the channel underlying our results, we have assumed that candidates’ policy
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biases are known. Voter uncertainty about these biases introduces additional issues, in par-
ticular whether a candidate’s platform can serve as a signal of his bias. We can show that,
under some conditions, there are pooling equilibria that preserve our main insights and that
the scope for separation is in fact limited (cf. Tanner, 2013). A thorough analysis is left for
future research.
We have modeled an election’s outcome as entirely determined by the median voter. In
practice, candidates may target other constituencies: voters in the party base (both because of
primaries and within general elections), interest groups, donors, etc. Our logic suggests that
if electoral pressures lead a candidate to target a constituency more extreme than himself, he
may make commitments that limit his ability to act contrary to his bias (where extremism
and bias are relative to the median voter). For example, at the behest of Grover Nordquist’s
Americans for Tax Reform, many Republicans have pledged to never vote for a tax increase.
It would be fruitful to study how electoral competition shapes political representation with
multiple constituencies.
Our results rely on the (common) assumption that candidates can credibly commit to their
platforms. The degree of commitment is limited, however, as candidates cannot commit to
which policy they will implement from an ambiguous platform. In practice, candidates do
sometimes break campaign pledges. Another interesting avenue for future research would be
to extend our framework to allow for campaign promises to be broken at a cost.
Appendices
A. State Distributions Satisfying our Assumptions
We first show that our technical assumptions on the distribution of states are satisfied by
familiar families of distributions.
Remark A.1. Both (2) and (3) hold for (i) the uniform distribution on [−1, 1] and (ii) the truncated
normal distribution on [−1, 1] with mean zero and variance of at least one.
Proof. Uniform and truncated normal distributions have log concave densities (Bagnoli and
Bergstrom, 2005, Table 1 and Theorem 9), which is a sufficient condition for (3) to hold (Bag-
noli and Bergstrom, 2005, Theorems 5 and 6). It is trivial that (2) holds for the uniform dis-
tribution, as the density is constant. Finally, it is straightforward to compute that for the
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truncated normal distribution with mean zero, σ2f ′(θ) = θf(θ), which implies (2) when
σ2 ≥ 1.
Remark A.2. Given any distribution that has a log-concave positive density that is twice differentiable
and symmetric around its mean, a suitable truncation and rescaling results in a density on [−1, 1] that
satisfies (2) and (3).
Proof. Fix any log-concave twice differentiable density h(θ) > 0 on [a, b] with −∞ ≤ a <
b ≤ ∞, and denote m := (a + b)/2 if a and b are finite and m := 0 otherwise (note that by
symmetry, a is finite if and only if b is). By symmetry, h′(m) = 0; further, −1 ≤ h′/h ≤ 1 in
some neighborhood of m. We proceed in two steps.
First, if needed, truncate h to an interval symmetric around m of length no more than two
in which −1 ≤ h′/h ≤ 1 throughout. With an abuse of notation, let the new density again be
denoted by h and the new endpoints by a and b. Log-concavity of the density is preserved
(Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, Theorem 9), and we now have −1 ≤ h′/h ≤ 1 on [a, b].
Second, define a density on [−1, 1] by f(θ) = h ((θ + 1)(b− a)/2 + a) /M , where M is a
constant determined by the requirement
∫ 1
−1 f(θ)dθ = 1. Since (θ + 1)(b − a)/2 + a is a linear
function of θ, f(θ) is again log-concave (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, Theorem 7), and hence











and b− a ∈ (0, 2], it follows that (2) is also satisfied.
B. Proofs of Results in the Main Text
B.1. Proofs for Section 3
The proof of Proposition 1 uses Alonso and Matouschek’s (2008) characterization of opti-
mal delegation sets. To invoke their results, we follow Alonso and Matouschek (2008, p. 264)
and define for each i ∈ {L,R} the backward bias function




and the forward bias function




Lemma B.1. Ti(θ) is convex when bi ∈ (−1, 1).
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Proof. Twice differentiating Ti(θ) and recalling that αi(θ) = bi+θ yields T ′′i (θ) = bif ′(θ)+f(θ).
The result follows from (2).
Proof of Proposition 1. We only provide the proof for candidate R; owing to the symmetry
of the state density, f(·), the arguments are symmetric for candidate L.
Case 1: Suppose bR ≥ 1. Since SR(t) = (1− F (t)) (αR(t)− E[θ|θ ≥ t]), the sign of SR(t)
is the same as that of bR + t − E[θ|θ ≥ t]. This expression is increasing in t by (3) and con-
sequently has range [bR − 1, bR] ⊂ R+. Thus, SR(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [−1, 1]. By Alonso and
Matouschek (2008, Proposition 1), the voter-optimal platform entails no discretion, which im-
plies A0R = {0}, i.e. the singleton consisting of the ex-ante optimal policy.
Case 2: Suppose bR ∈ [0, 1). Define θR as the solution to
bR + θR = E[θ|θ ≥ θR]. (B.3)
Note that θR ∈ (−1, 1] is unique because t − E[θ|θ ≥ t] is increasing by (3) . Using the same
logic as in the previous case, it holds that sign[SR(θ)] = sign[θ − θR].
Moreover, since TR(t) = F (t) (αR(t)− E[θ|θ ≤ t]) and TR(−1) = 0, condition (3) implies
that TR(·) is increasing and hence always non-negative. Together with Lemma B.1, these facts
about SR(·) and TR(·) show that the conditions in Alonso and Matouschek (2008, Proposition
6) for “upper threshold” delegation to be optimal are satisfied. Thus, those authors’ argu-
ments yield that the voter-optimal platform is the intervalA0R = [αR(−1), αR(θR)]. Comparing
Equation B.3 and the definition of a0 in Equation 4, it follows that a0 = bR + θR = αR(θR) ∈
(0, 1), and hence A0R = [αR(−1), a0].
Proof of Proposition 2. We provides proofs for i = R; the arguments are analogous for i = L.
Assume bR ∈ (0, 1). We use the fact that a0 = bR + θR, where θR is defined by Equation B.3.
Part 1: Condition (3) and Equation B.3 imply that θR is decreasing in bR; hence the right-
hand side (RHS) of Equation B.3, which is equal to a0, is also decreasing in bR.









R, R) = −b2RF (θR)−
∫ 1
θR
(bR + θR − θ)2f(θ)dθ.




= −2bRF (θR) < 0, where the
strict inequality owes to bR > 0 and θR > −1.
Part 3: Since E[bR + θ] = bR, it follows from Equation B.4 that
E[aR(θ, A0R)] = bR − (1− F (θR))E[bR + θ − (bR + θR)|θ ≥ θR] = F (θR)bR,
where the second equality uses Equation B.3. The desired results follow from the above sim-
plification by noting that bR > 0, θR > −1, and lim
bR→1
θR = −1.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 1
To aid with subsequent proofs, we will prove a result (Proposition B.1 below) that is
stronger than Lemma 1. To state it, let APOi be the set of platforms that constitute a pair-
wise Pareto frontier between a candidate i ∈ {L,R} and the voter. More precisely, for each
i ∈ {L,R}, define APOi as the set of i’s platforms such that for each Ai ∈ APOi , there exists a
δ ∈ [0, 1] such that Ai maximizes
δWi(Ai, i) + (1− δ)W0(Ai, i). (B.5)
Proposition B.1. In any equilibrium in which candidate i ∈ {L,R} wins with positive probability,
he plays a pure strategy of choosing a platform in APOi . Moreover,
APOL =
{[a, αL(1)] : a ∈ [αL(−1), a
0]} if bL > −1,
{{a} : a ∈ [αL(1), 0]} ∪ {[a, αL(1)] : a ∈ [αL(−1), αL(1))} if bL ≤ −1,
(B.6)
APOR =
{[αR(−1), a] : a ∈ [a
0, αR(1)]} if bR < 1,
{{a} : a ∈ [0, αR(−1)]} ∪ {[αR(−1), a] : a ∈ (αR(−1), αR(1)]} if bR ≥ 1.
(B.7)
The proof of Proposition B.1 consists of a number of steps. We begin with Lemma B.2,
which shows why the characterizations in Equation B.6 and Equation B.7 are true. Given any
platform A and x ∈ R, we write A+ x := {a+ x : a ∈ A}.
24
Lemma B.2. For any i ∈ {L,R} and any weight δ ∈ [0, 1], there is a unique Aδi that maximizes
(B.5). Aδi = A˜δi + δbi, where A˜δi is the voter-optimal platform when candidate i’s bias is (1 − δ)bi.
Consequently, by Proposition 1, (B.6) and (B.7) hold.
Proof. For any weight δ ∈ [0, 1], Aδi maximizes expression (B.5) if and only if it is a solu-
tion to an optimal delegation problem where the candidate’s utility function continues to be
−(a− bi − θ)2 but the voter’s utility function is instead
−δ(a− θ − bi)2 − (1− δ)(a− θ)2 = −(a− δbi − θ)2 − δ(1− δ)b2i .
We can just as well ignore the constant −δ(1 − δ)b2i and take the voter’s utility function to be
−(a−δbi−θ)2. With a change of variables a˜ = a−δbi, we see that this problem is isomorphic to
our baseline problem when the candidate’s bias is (1−δ)bi; i.e., to a problem where the voter’s
utility function is −(a˜− θ)2 and the candidate’s is −(a˜− (1− δ)bi − θ)2. Given the solution A˜δi
to that problem, reversing the change of variables yields the solution Aδi = A˜δi + δbi.
Equation B.6 and Equation B.7 follow from the above characterization and the characteri-
zation of voter-optimal platforms in Proposition 1.
Our goal now is to show that any candidate i ∈ {L,R}who wins with positive probability
must play a pure strategy and choose a platform in APOi . This is the content of Lemma B.6
and Lemma B.7 below. We proceed via three intermediate lemmas. Throughout, a candidate’s
mixed strategy is viewed as a probability measure on the (Borel-)measurable sets of platforms.
Lemma B.3. Fix a candidate i ∈ {L,R} and any strategy for −i. Any best response for i must put
zero probability on the set of platforms Ai = {Ai : Ai /∈ APOi and Ai wins with positive probability}.
Roughly, the lemma says that against any strategy for candidate −i, any best response for
i only uses platforms that either lose for sure or maximize a weighted average of i’s and the
voter’s utilities.
Proof. Suppose not, per contra. First observe that i’s strategy must put 0 probability on any
subset of Ai such that i would prefer to lose than win no matter his realized platform from
the subset; otherwise, i can increase his payoff by shifting all mass from the subset to his
full-discretion platform, [αi(−1), αi(1)], a contradiction. Since Ai is disjoint from APOi , the
characterization of APOi in Equation B.6 and Equation B.7 implies that for each Ai ∈ Ai there
exists a platform A˜i ∈ APOi such that W0(A˜i, i) ≥ W0(Ai, i) and Wi(A˜i, i) > Wi(Ai, i). By
changing each platform Ai ∈ Ai to A˜i, i would not decrease his probability of winning while
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increasing his expected utility conditional on winning, contradicting that he is playing a best
response.
Lemma B.4. Fix any platforms AL and AR with E[aR(θ, AR)] ≥ E[aL(θ, AL)]. It holds for each
i ∈ {L,R} that
W0(Ai, i) ≥ W0(A−i,−i) =⇒ Wi(Ai, i) ≥ Wi(A−i,−i) + φ.
Thus, ifAi wins with positive probability againstA−i, i prefers winning withAi to losing againstA−i.
Proof. Given any platforms AL and AR, a routine computation establishes that for i ∈ {L,R},










2bi [(ai(θ, Ai)− a−i(θ, A−i))] f(θ)dθ,
and








Wi(Ai, i)−Wi(A−i,−i)− [W0(Ai, i)−W0(A−i,−i)] = φ+ 2bi {E[ai(θ, Ai)]− E[a−i(θ, A−i)]} .
The result follows because, by hypothesis, 2bi {E[ai(θ, Ai)]− E[a−i(θ, A−i)]} ≥ 0.
Lemma B.5. Fix i ∈ {L,R} and some strategy for candidate −i that puts zero probability on
{A−i : b−iE[a−i(θ, A−i)] < 0 and W0(A−i,−i) ≤ W0(A0i , i)}.
Assume that playing A0i gives i a positive probability of winning. Then, any best response for i puts
zero probability on the set of platforms with which i would lose with probability one.
Roughly, the lemma says that if −i only uses platforms that would result in expected
policies opposite to i’s bias whenever they tie or win against i’s voter-optimal platform, then
either i will lose for sure no matter the platform he proposes, or his best response cannot use
any platform that loses for sure. In particular, his best response cannot mix over platforms
that lose for sure and platforms that don’t.
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Proof. Suppose not, per contra. Consider an alternative strategy that is identical to the given
best response except for shifting all probability mass away from Ai to the platform A0i . The











where the expectation is taken using both −i’s strategy and the voter’s behavior (specifi-
cally, her behavior when indifferent). As Pr(A0i wins againstA−i) > 0 only if W0(A0i , i) ≥
W0(A−i,−i) and by hypothesis there is positive probability on {A−i : A0i wins against A−i},
Lemma B.4 implies that expression (B.8) is positive. It follows that the alternative strategy is
a better response than the given best response, a contradiction.
Lemma B.6. In any equilibrium, if i ∈ {L,R} wins with positive probability, then his strategy puts
probability one within the set of platforms APOi .
Proof. Fix i ∈ {L,R} and an equilibrium in which iwins with positive probability. Lemma B.3
implies that with probability one, whenever i is elected his platform is inAPOi . Any such plat-
form Ai has biE[ai(θ, Ai)] ≥ 0 because of Proposition 2 part 3. If i wins with probability one,
we are done, so suppose −i wins with positive probability as well. As the above points now
hold analogously for−i, whenever−i is elected his platform has b−iE[a−i(θ, A−i)] ≥ 0. We can
then apply Lemma B.5 to conclude that since i is playing a best response, he puts zero prob-
ability on any set of platforms that all lose with probability one. It follows from Lemma B.3
that with probability one i must play a platform in APOi .
Lemma B.7. In any equilibrium, a candidate who wins with positive probability plays a pure strategy.
Moreover, if both win with positive probability, each candidate i ∈ {L,R} chooses A0i .
Proof. If one candidate i wins with probability one, then Wi(Ai, i) must be constant across all
platforms in the support of his strategy. Since this support is contained in APOi (Lemma B.6)
and Wi(Aδi , i) is increasing in δ, i must be playing a pure strategy.23
So assume both candidates win with positive probability. By Lemma B.6, we can view
each candidate i’s strategy as CDF Hi(δ) over weights δ ∈ [0, 1], where the platform corre-
sponding to δ is Aδi defined in Lemma B.2. For each candidate i, let δi := sup{δ : Hi(δ) < 1} be
the supremum of i’s support. If δL = δR = 0, both candidates are playing a pure strategy. So,
suppose to contradiction that max{δL, δR} > 0. Conditional on a candidate being elected, the
voter’s (resp., the candidate’s) utility is continuous and decreasing (resp., increasing) in that
23 Recall Aδi = A˜
δ
i + δbi, where A˜
δ
i is the voter-optimal platform when candidate i’s bias is (1− δ)bi.
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candidate’s choice of δ. We make two claims:
1. The voter must be indifferent over the two candidates when they each choose δi: other-
wise, if W0(A
δ−i
−i ,−i) > W0(Aδii , i) for some i, then i loses with probability one when he
chooses any δ in a neighborhood containing δi, contradicting Lemma B.5.
2. limδ↑δi Hi(δ) = 1, i.e. there is no atom on δi. Suppose there were: then −i cannot have
an atom on δ−i because each candidate j ∈ {L,R} would then prefer a slightly lower
weight than δj (using the previous claim and Lemma B.4), and it is feasible for at least
one candidate to choose a lower weight (by the assumption that max{δL, δR} > 0). But i
being the only candidate with an atom at δi contradicts Lemma B.5 because δi is played
by i with positive probability despite winning with zero probability.
Therefore, each candidate i wins with probability (arbitrarily close to) zero when he chooses
(δ arbitrarily close to) δi, which implies that the expected payoff for i from choosing a platform
(arbitrarily close to) δi is (arbitrarily close to) E[Wi(Aδ−i−i ,−i)]. On the other hand, i’s expected
payoff from choosing any platform that wins with positive probability—and such platforms
exist as both candidates win with positive probability—is larger because of Lemma B.4, given
that −i’s strategy’s support is within APO−i . Thus, i is not indifferent over all platforms in his
strategy’s support, a contradiction.
When both candidates win with positive probability, the above argument establishing that
max{δL, δR} = 0 implies that both candidates are proposing their respective voter-optimal
platforms, A0L and A
0
R, by the definition of δL and δR.
Proposition B.1 (and hence Lemma 1) follows from Lemma B.7, Lemma B.6, and Lemma B.2.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Throughout this proof, let bR ≤ −bL. We will repeatedly use the following facts without
explicit mention. By Proposition B.1, a candidate i who wins with positive probability plays
a pure strategy of choosing a platform Aδi for some δ ∈ [0, 1], where Aδi was characterized
in Lemma B.2. We will sometimes refer to such a candidate as simply choosing δ ∈ [0, 1].
An implication of Proposition B.1 and Lemma B.5 is that if candidate i wins with positive
probability, then −i prefers to win (rather than lose) with any platform that can win. Lastly,
for each i ∈ {L,R}, Wi(Aδi , i) (resp., W0(Aδi , i)) is continuous and increasing (resp., decreasing)
in δ.
The following lemma simplifies the analysis substantially.
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Lemma B.8. There is an equilibrium in which both candidates win with positive probability if and
only if either bL = −bR or both candidates are extreme.
Proof. If both candidates win with positive probability, each candidate i ∈ {L,R} chooses A0i
(Lemma B.7). If bR < min{−bL, 1} then W0(A0R, R) > W0(A0L, L) by item 2 of Proposition 2, so
there is no equilibrium in which both win with positive probability. Conversely, if bR = −bL or
both candidates are extreme, thenW0(A0R, R) = W0(A
0
L, L) and such an equilibrium exists.
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 3.
Parts 1 and 3: Existence follows from Lemma B.8. To see that all equilibria have platforms
A0L and A
0
R, note that there is no equilibrium in which a candidate i wins with probability one
and proposes Ai 6= A0i ; for, the opponent −i could propose A−i = A0−i and instead win. The
only other possibility is that both candidates win with positive probability, in which case the
results follow from Lemma B.7 and Lemma B.8.
Part 2: Let i ∈ {L,R} be a candidate with bi = 0. It is an equilibrium for i to propose
A∗i = A
0
i = [−1, 1] and the voter to elect i regardless of −i’s platform, no matter −i’s strategy.
By Proposition B.1, in any equilibrium if i is elected with positive probability his platform
must be A∗i . Suppose there is an equilibrium in which −i is elected with positive probability.
Since i prefers to be elected with any platform, he must be playing platform A∗i and it further
holds that b−i = 0 and −i must be playing A∗−i = [−1, 1].
Part 4: By Lemma B.8 there is no equilibrium in which both candidates win with posi-
tive probability. L cannot win with probability one because R can choose a platform that
guarantees winning, as W0(A0R, R) > W0(A
0
L, L) by part 2 of Proposition 2. So let A
δ
R ∈ APOR
denoteR’s equilibrium platform that wins with probability one. It cannot be thatW0(AδR, R) >
W0(A
0
L, L), because then δ < 1 (as by hypothesis W0(A
1
R, R) < W0(A
0
L, L)) and R can do better
by choosing a slightly higher δ and still winning. It also cannot be thatW0(AδR, R) < W0(A
0
L, L)
because then L can do better by playing A0L and winning. Thus, L must be playing A
0
L and




WR([αR(−1), aR], R) s.t. W0([αR(−1), aR], R) = W0(A0L, L).
Since the maximand is increasing in aR on the relevant domain, the uniqueness of a∗R
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follows if W0([αR(−1), aR], R) is decreasing on aR ∈ [a0, αR(1)]. On this domain,














= 2(1− F (aR − bR))E [θ − aR|θ ≥ aR − bR] . (B.9)
Since E[θ − a0|θ ≥ a0 − bR] = 0 by definition of a0 (recall (4)), condition (3) implies that
expression (B.9) is negative for all aR ∈ (a0, αR(1)).
Part 5: SinceW0(A1R, R) > W (A
0
L, L) by hypothesis, it is immediate that in any equilibrium
R must win with probability one by choosing A∗R = A
1
R.
B.4. Details on Implications
As noted in the text, all the implications in Section 4 are stated for cases where for each
i ∈ {L,R}, W 0(A0i , i) > W (R,−i) and |bi| > 0; in other words, setting aside the cases that fall
into parts 2 and 5 of Proposition 3. With this in mind, we enumerate each implication below
and explain how it derives from each part of Proposition 3:
1. Both candidates propose the same platform in part 1 but not in part 3 unless a0 = 1−bR =
1 + bL. In part 4 candidate R proposes a wider interval than L, by Proposition 2 part 2
and a∗R > a
0.
2. Candidates are extreme in part 1. The case of part 3 follows from Proposition 2 part 3.
For part 4, it holds a fortiori.
3. Neither candidate is ambiguous in part 1. In part 3, the symmetry of f(·) and that a0 = a0
implies that they are equally ambiguous. So the only relevant case is part 4. Here, the
result is immediate if −bL > 1 because then L is not ambiguous; the case of bL < 1
follows from Lemma B.9 below.
4. The relevant case is part 3, and the result follows from Proposition 2 part 3.
5. Divergence occurs in parts 3 and 4. In both cases, voter welfare is W0(A0L, L), which is
higher than W0({0}, L), the highest possible welfare under singleton platforms.
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6. In parts 1, 3 and 4, candidates are less ambiguous than they would be without competi-
tion (in which case they would choose their full-discretion platform). However only in
parts 1 and 3 does the winning candidate choose his voter-optimal platform.
7. With symmetric bias, this result follows from part 3 and Proposition 2 part 2. For the
asymmetric case, part 4 and Proposition 2 part 2 imply that voter welfare increases when
L’s bias decreases in magnitude and is constant in R’s bias, as voter welfare equals
W0(A
0
L, L) even though R wins with probability one.
It remains only to establish the following lemma.
Lemma B.9. If 0 < bR < −bL < 1 and electoral competition is effective then R is more ambiguous
than L.
Proof. Fix any 0 < bR < −bL < 1. We will show below that given any policy platform
[αR(−1), aR] with aR ∈ [a0, αR(1)], the variance of R’s policy is independent of bR and in-
creasing in aR. This fact implies the lemma when combined with the symmetric analogue for
candidate L and that by part 4 of Proposition 3, a∗R > a
0 > −a0 = −a∗L.
To prove the claim, it is useful to denote θˆR := aR − bR. Since R’s policy in any state θ is
min{θ + bR, θˆR + bR}, R’s expected policy is
E[aR(θ, [αR(−1), aR])] =
∫ θˆR
−1





θf(θ)dθ + (1− F (θˆR))θˆR.








(θ − aeR(θˆR))2f(θ)dθ + (1− F (θˆR))(θˆR − aeR(θˆR))2.
So VR(θˆR) is independent of bR. Differentiating,












(1− F (θˆR))(θˆR − aeR(θˆR)).
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= 1− F (θˆR) ∈ (0, 1),
θˆR > a
e
R(θˆR), and ∫ θˆR
−1
(θ − aeR(θˆR))f(θ)dθ = (1− F (θˆR))(aeR(θˆR)− θˆR) < 0.
B.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Fix any Ai and Aj . Writing Wv(·) for the welfare of voter v, we compute




(aj(θ, Aj)− v − θ)2 − (ai(θ, Ai)− v − θ)2
]
f(θ)dθ.
Differentiating and simplifying yields





(aj(θ, Aj)− ai(θ, Ai))f(θ)dθ,
which is independent of v. Thus, as a function of v, Wv(Ai, i) −Wv(Aj, j) crosses 0 at most
once. The result follows from the hypothesis that W0(Ai, i)−W0(Aj, j) > 0.
B.6. Proof of Proposition 5
Part 1: We claim that in any pure-strategy equilibrium with platforms A∗L and A
∗
R, it holds
that A∗i ∈ APOi for each i ∈ {L,R}, where APOi was defined in Proposition B.1. To see why the
claim is true, observe that each candidate must win with positive probability (owing to the
support of the valence shock; see fn. 21 in the paper) and that Wi(A∗i , i) > Wi(A∗−i,−i) for each
i ∈ {L,R}; otherwise, i could deviate to proposing [αi(−1), αi(1)] and increase his expected
utility. Consequently, the same logic as in Lemma B.3 applies.
So, given the hypothesis |bi| ∈ (0, 1) for each i ∈ {L,R}, the platforms in any pure-strategy
equilibrium satisfy A∗L = [a
∗
L, αL(1)], with a
∗
L ∈ [αL(−1), a0], and A∗R = [αR(−1), a∗R], with
a∗R ∈ [a0, αR(1)]. It remains to prove that a∗R /∈ {a0, αR(1)}; the argument for L is analogous.
Given any AL, R’s optimal choice of aR for a platform [αR(−1), aR] maximizes
ŴR(aR, AL) := G(∆0(aR, AL))∆R(aR, AL) +WR(AL, L), (B.10)
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Note that on the relevant domain, aR ∈ [a0, αR], G(·) > 0 and g(·) > 0. Using
WR([αR(−1), aR], R) = −
∫ 1
aR−bR
(aR − bR − θ)2f(θ)dθ






(aR − bR − θ)f(θ)dθ, (B.13)
∂2WR([αR(−1), aR], R)
∂a2R
= −2(1− F (aR − bR)), (B.14)
∂2W0([αR(−1), aR], R)
∂a2R
= 2bRf(aR − bR)− 2(1− F (aR − bR)). (B.15)













so that the RHS of Equation B.11 is positive at aR = a0, which implies a∗R > a0.





















Hence, at aR = αR(1), the RHS of Equation B.11 is zero while the RHS of Equation B.12 is
positive (noting that ∆R(αR(1), AL) > 0). Thus, ŴR(·, AL) is strictly convex in a neighborhood
αR(1) and attains a local minimum at αR(1), which implies a∗R < αR(1).
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Part 2: We prove the result for i = R; it is symmetric for i = L. For any aR ∈ (a0, αR(1))
and any AL, each term on the RHS of (B.11) is independent of φ, except ∆R([αR(−1), aR], R),
which tends to∞ as φ → ∞. Moreover, ∂W0([αR(−1),aR],R)
∂aR
< 0 for any aR ∈ (a0, αR(1)), as was
established in the discussion around Equation B.9. Thus, for any value of aR ∈ (a0, αR(1)),
the RHS of (B.11) becomes negative as φ→∞, and we established above that aR = αR(1) is a
local minimizer of ŴR(aR, AL). The result follows.
B.7. Proof of Proposition 6
Candidate R wins the election if and only if η < W0(A∗R, R) − W0(A∗L, L). By part 1 of
Proposition 2 and Lemma B.9, R is more ambiguous if elected under A0R than L is if elected
under A0L. By part 2 of Proposition 2, W0(A
0
L, L) < W0(A
0
R, R). Hence, by part 2 of Proposi-
tion 5, there exists a φ such that for all φ > φ, (i) R’s platform is more ambiguous than L’s,
and (ii) R is elected with probability G(W0(A∗R, R)−W0(A∗L, L)) > 1/2.
C. Equilibria with Valence Shocks
In this appendix, we consider the setting with valence shocks described in Subsection 5.3.
We first provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition C.1. Assume |bi| ∈ (0, 1) for each i ∈ {L,R}. A pure-strategy equilibrium exists when
the valence shock, η, is uniformly distributed.
Proof. Given any AL, the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 5 (part 1) implies that
any best response AR is an interval AR = [αR(−1), aR] for some aR ∈ [a0, αR(1)]. As the
analog holds for candidate L, it suffices to show that there is a pure-strategy equilibrium
when the candidates are restricted to use interval platforms with respective thresholds aR ∈
[a0, αR(1)] and aL ∈ [αL(−1), a0]. Restricting to such platforms defines a game with non-
empty, compact, convex, one-dimensional strategy spaces, where candidate R’s payoff is
given by ŴR(aR, [aL, αL(1)]) defined in Equation B.10, and candidate L’s payoff is analogous.
Since WR(aR, [aL, αL(1)]) is continuous in both aR and aL, it suffices to show that the function
is quasi-concave in aR, as a standard existence argument (based, for example, on Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem) then guarantees pure-strategy equilibria (using a symmetric argument
for quasi-concavity of L’s payoff, owing the symmetry in η’s uniform distribution).
Accordingly, fix any AL = [αL(−1), aL] with aL ∈ [αL(−1), a0]. For brevity, we abuse no-
tation in the remainder of the proof and drop the dependence of various functions on AL,
e.g., we write ŴR(aR) instead of ŴR(aR, AL). As η is uniformly distributed, ŴR(aR) is twice
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differentiable on (a0, αR(1)). Using primes for derivatives with respect to aR, ŴR is thus qua-
siconcave if
at any aR ∈ (a0, αR(1)) : Ŵ ′R(aR) = 0 =⇒ Ŵ ′′R(aR) < 0. (C.1)






where the division is valid because W ′0(aR) < 0 at an interior aR (see Equation B.9 and the
subsequent paragraph). Plugging the above equation into Equation B.12 and manipulating—
using the fact that g′(·) = 0 by the uniform distribution assumption—yields













As W ′0(aR) < 0 < W ′R(aR) and g(∆0(aR)) > 0, the second term in the RHS of Equation C.2 is
negative. So the RHS is negative if its first term is non-positive. As G(∆0(aR)) > 0 > W ′0(aR),
that term being non-positive is equivalent to W ′′R(aR)W
′
0(aR) ≥ W ′R(aR)W ′′0 (aR). As W ′R(aR) =
W ′0(aR) + 2bR(1− F (aR − bR)) by Equation B.9 and Equation B.13, this in turn is equivalent to
W ′′R(aR)W
′
0(aR) ≥ [W ′0(aR) + 2bR(1− F (aR − bR))] [W ′′R(aR) + 2bRf(aR − bR)]
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ f(aR − bR)W ′0(aR) + (1− F (aR − bR))W ′′R(aR) + 2bRf(aR − bR)(1− F (aR − bR))
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ f(aR − bR)E[θ − aR|θ ≥ aR − bR]− (1− F (aR − bR)) + bRf(aR − bR) using (B.9) and (B.14)
⇐⇒ 1− F (t) ≥ f(t) (E[θ|θ ≥ t]− t) changing variables to t = aR − bR ∈ (−1, 1)
⇐⇒ 1 ≥ d
dt
E[θ|θ ≥ t].
The last inequality holds by our maintained condition (3). We have thus proved (C.1).
We next show that once we allow for mixed strategies, an equilibrium always exists and
that every equilibrium must involve candidates competing in interval platforms; moreover,
as the concern for holding office gets arbitrarily large, candidates’ platforms converge to the
voter-optimal platform.
Proposition C.2. Suppose |bi| ∈ (0, 1) for each i ∈ {L,R}. Then a (possibly-mixed) equilibrium
exists. Furthermore:
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1. In every equilibrium, with probability one, candidate L’s platform is in
APOL = {[aL, αL(1)] : aL ∈ [αL(−1), a0]},
and candidate R’s platform is in
APOR = {[αR(−1), aR] : aR ∈ [a0, αR(1)]}.
2. For any ε > 0, there exists a φ such that, for all φ > φ, in every equilibrium, with probability
one, candidate L’s platform is in {[aL, αL(1)] : aL ∈ [a0 − ε, a0]}, and candidate R’s platform is
in {[αR(−1), aR] : aR ∈ [a0, a0 + ε]}.
Proof. The argument for part 1 is the same as in the proof of Proposition 5 (part 1). Hence
we can restrict attention to each candidate i choosing among platforms APOi , or equivalently
choosing among the corresponding thresholds, aL ∈ [αL(−1), a0] and aR ∈ [a0, αR(1)] respec-
tively. As these strategy spaces are non-empty, compact, one-dimensional sets and payoffs
are continuous (as discussed in the proof of Proposition C.1), existence of equilibrium follows
from Glicksberg (1952).
We prove part 2 of the proposition for i = R; the argument is symmetric for i = L. By part
1, we can restrict attention to platforms of the form AL = [aL, αL(1)] and AR = [αR(−1), aR]
with aL ∈ [αL(−1), a0] and aR ∈ [a0, αR(1)]. Recall that by definition
∆i(aR, AL) = Wi([αR(−1), aR], R)−Wi(AL, L).
For any aR ∈ (a0, αR(1)] the following statements hold for all aL ∈ [αL(−1), a0]:
1. W0([αR(−1), aR], R) < W0([αR(−1), a0], R), and so
G(∆0(aR, [aL, αL(1)])) < G(∆0(a
0, [aL, αL(1)]));
2. ∆R(aR, [aL, αL(1)])−∆R(a0, [aL, αL(1)]) is bounded;
3. ∆R(a0, [aL, αL(1)]) ≥ φ.
As [αL(−1), a0] is compact and ŴR(aR, aL) defined in Equation B.10 is continuous, it follows






0, aL)− ŴR(aR, aL) =∞.
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0, aL)− ŴR(aR, aL) > 0.
It follows that when φ > φ, candidate R cannot be playing a best response unless he chooses
some aR ∈ [a0, a0 + ε] with probability one.
Finally, notice that part 2 of Proposition C.2 implies that, with high probability, the more
moderate candidate proposes the more ambiguous platform and wins with probability greater
than 1/2. Consequently, one can derive a mixed-strategy analogue of Proposition 6 as well.
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